How does StreamPark's permission model prevent one team from accessing another team's alert configurations?

The intended design is straightforward: alert configurations, like applications and projects, are meant to be scoped to the team that created them, so a user in Team A should never see Team B's DingTalk tokens or webhook secrets. In practice, getting this right requires every endpoint that touches alert data to actually enforce that scoping, not just the UI hiding the option.

This is a real class of bug that security-conscious StreamPark operators watch for: a backend endpoint (for alert configuration, environment settings, or similar shared resources) that's missing a proper authorization check can end up returning every team's records regardless of which team the requesting user belongs to, even though the console's own screens never surface that path. The fix is enforcing ownership-scoped checks on the backend itself — filtering by creator or team membership at the service layer — rather than relying on the frontend to simply not render other teams' data.

The broader lesson generalizes past alerts specifically: any admin-adjacent surface in a multi-tenant console (settings pages, environment configuration, debugging consoles) needs its own explicit authorization check, because "the normal UI doesn't expose it" is not the same guarantee as "the backend refuses to return it." Teams running StreamPark in production should keep it patched and periodically review which endpoints enforce team- or ownership-scoped access versus which assume the UI is the only caller.